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How to do realistic political theory (and why you might want to) 
 
 
Abstract 
In recent years a number of realist thinkers have charged much contemporary political theory with being idealistic 
and moralistic. While the basic features of the realist counter-movement are reasonably well understood, realism is 
still considered a critical, primarily negative creed which fails to offer a positive, alternative way of thinking 
normatively about politics. Aiming to counteract this general perception, in this article I draw on Bernard 
:LOOLDPV·VFODLPVDERXWKRZWRFRQVWUXFWDSROLWLFDOO\FRKHUHQWFRQFHSWLRQRIOLEHUW\IURPWKHQRQ-political value of 
freedom. I do this because :LOOLDPV·VDUJXPHQWSURYLGHVan illuminating example of the distinctive nature of realist 
SROLWLFDO WKLQNLQJ DQG LWV DWWUDFWLRQV , DUJXH WKDW :LOOLDPV·V DFFRXQW RI UHDOLVW SROLWLFDO WKLQNLQJ FKDOOHQJHV WKH
orthodox moralist claim that normative political arguments must be guided by an ideal ethical theory. I then spell 
out the repercussiRQV:LOOLDPV·VFODLPVDERXWWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRISROLWLFDORSSRVLWLRQDQGQRQ-moralised accounts 
of motivation have for our understanding of the role and purpose of political theory. I conclude by defending the 
realist claim that action-guiding political theory should accordingly take certain features of our politics as given, 
most centrally the reality of political opposition and the passions and experiences that motivate them. On this 
reading political realism offers a viable way of thinking about political values which cannot be understood in terms 
of the categories of intellectual separation ² ideal/nonideal or factinsensitive/fact-sensitive ² that have marked 
political theory in recent years. 
 
 
The jumble, the mayhem, the mess proved itself more subtle tKDQ WKLV RQH·V LGHRORJ\ DQG WKDW RQH·V
morality.1   
 
Although the broad contours of the realist turn in political theory are now reasonably well 
understood, thus far most commentators have focused on the critical nature of the movement by 
H[DPLQLQJ UHDOLVWV· RSSRVLWLRQ WR WKH ¶applied-ethics· program that has dominated political 
philosophy/theory in recent decades.2 This focus has obscured the more constructive elements 
of realist political thinking, a neglect which perhaps explains why some scholars continue to 
mistakenly elide realism with nonideal theory (Stemplowska and Swift 2012, Valentini 2012; for a 
reply see Sleat forthcoming). In this article I aim to rectify this lacuna in the literature by drawing 
RQ %HUQDUG :LOOLDPV·V DFFRXQW RI how to construct a political conception of liberty from the 
non-political value of freedom. This is because it provides an illuminating example of the 
distinctive nature of realist political thinking and its attractions.3  
                                                 
1 Roth 2000, 3. 
2 For discussions of realism in these terms see Baderin 2014, Galston 2010, Philp 2012, Rossi and Sleat 2014, and 
Stears 2007. 
3 The following abbreviations are used for selected works by Bernard Williams (full citations are listed in the 
bibliography): IBWD: In the Beginning was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument; ML: Moral Luck; MSH: 
Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers 1982²1993; PS: Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956 ² 
1972; PHD: Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline; SP: The Sense of the Past; SN: Shame and Necessity. I mainly focus on 
¶)URP)UHHGRP WR/LEHUW\7KH&RQVWUXFWLRQ RI D3ROLWLFDO9DOXH· IBWD, 75 ² 96). As this paper was originally 
published in Philosophy and Public Affairs it is more polished than many of the other essays in IBWD which are 
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In Section 1 I characterise the nature of the anti-moralist commitments that motivate 
much contemporary realist theorising. In section 2 I present :LOOLDPV·V DFFRXQW RI SROLWLFDO
construction as it is an exemplary example of the third commitment outlined in Section 1. In 
6HFWLRQ,IRFXVRQWKH¶UHDOLVPFRQVWUDLQW·:LOOLDPVDGYRFDWHV, and note how it challenges the 
orthodoxies of contemporary political theory. In Section 4 I spell out the repercussions 
:LOOLDPV·V FODLPV DERXW WKH VLJQLILFDQFHRISROLWLFDO RSSRVLWLRQ DQGQRQ-moralised accounts of 
motivation have for our understanding of the role and purpose of political theory. I conclude by 
arguing that Williams offers a viable way of thinking about political values which cannot be 
understood in terms of the categories of intellectual separation ² ideal/nonideal or fact-
insensitive/fact-sensitive ² that have marked political theory in recent years.  
 
1. Realism as anti-moralism 
    There are three principal, albeit purposefully underdetermined, correctives to the 
moralistic character of contemporary political theory that realists typically endorse. First, realists 
are committed to the idea that we should not reduce political philosophy (or politics) to moral 
philosophy (or morality) because they stress the ¶GLVWLQFWLYHQHVV DQG DXWRQRP\RI WKHSROLWLFDO
IURPRWKHUVSKHUHV· (Sleat 2011, 471). This is often a consequence of the fact that they endorse 
WKH +REEHVLDQ FODLP WKDW SROLWLFDO RUGHU ¶LV WKH sine qua non IRU HYHU\ RWKHU SROLWLFDO JRRG· 
(Galston 2010, 408). However the insistence that politics must not be reduced to morality can 
also follow from the weaker claim that moral philosophy cannot be the authoritative source for 
VHWWOLQJ TXHVWLRQV RI SROLWLFV EHFDXVH ¶WKH GHPDQGV RI SROLWLFV DUH VHHQ DV GLVWLQFWLYH DQG DV
FRPSURPLVLQJRIRUGLQDU\PRUDOLW\· (Philp 2012, 631). Seeing politics as a form of applied ethics 
not only misunderstands the nature of distinctively political goods ² like order and security ² but 
also blinds us to the fact political recommendations cannot be exhaustively determined by moral 
                                                                                                                                                        
unpublished manuscripts and SLqFHVG·RFFDVLRQ. Moreover, the fact that Williams chose to publish this paper rather than 
his work on legitimacy before his death is significant, yet the paper tends to be overlooked by those who discuss 
:LOOLDPV·VSROLWLFDOWKRXJKW 
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considerations from outside politics, even though within politics some of these considerations 
obviously might have force (Philp 2007). 
Second, realists stress that much contemporary political theory operates with an idealised 
conception of moral psychology. This has led many realists to bemoan ¶high-OLEHUDOLVP·V· pursuit 
of moralised consensus on principles of justice because ¶FRQWHPSRUDU\VRFLHW\ LVIDUWRRGHHSO\
GLYLGHG IRU DQ\ IRUP RI VLJQLILFDQW VRFLDO DJUHHPHQW WR EH REWDLQHG HLWKHU WKURXJK ´UDWLRQDOµ
reflection or through deliberaWLYHH[FKDQJH·(Stears 2007, 541). Questions about the accuracy of 
this critique abound (Sangiovanni 2008). But such concerns need not concern us too deeply here, 
as the idealised moral psychology aspect of the realist critique has significant repercussions for 
UHDOLVWV·FRQVWUXFWLYHDFFRXQWRIKRZwe ought to approach the study of politics, and that is what 
I wish to focus on here. )RUH[DPSOHLQFRQWUDVWWR5DZOV·s realistic utopianism (Rawls 2002, 5-
6), Williams endorses a Nietzschean minimalism which is motivated by the sense that 
¶VRSKLVWLFDWHGDQGUHIOHFWLYHREVHUYHUVKDYHDOZD\VKDGJRRGUHDVRQWRWKLQNWKDWVWRULHVKXPDQ
beings tell themselves about the ethical tend to be optimistic, self-serving, superstitious, vengeful 
or otherwLVH QRW ZKDW WKH\ VHHP WR EH· :LOOLDPV   7KLV DSSURDFK proceeds by 
LGHQWLI\LQJ¶DQH[FHVVRIPRUDOFRQWHQWLQSV\FKRORJ\E\DSSHDOLQJILUVWWRZKDWDQH[SHULHQFHG
honest, subtle and unoptimistic interpreter might make of human behaviour elsewheUH·ZKHUH
such an interpretation LVVDLGWREH¶using an unashamedly evaluative expression ² UHDOLVWLF·(SP, 
302). In this light, realist thinkers like Williams and Geuss are best read as endorsing a 
¶7KXF\GLGHDQUHDOLVP· which diagnoses much of the philosophical tradition ² and by extension 
contemporary normative political theorising ² as being ¶deeply optimistic·.  
This optimism had several related aspects. First of all, traditional philosophers assumed that the world 
could be made cognitively accessible to us without remainder ... Second, they assumed that when the 
ZRUOGZDVFRUUHFWO\XQGHUVWRRGLWZRXOGPDNHPRUDOVHQVHWRXV7KLUGWKHNLQGRI¶PRUDOVHQVH·ZKLFK
the world made to us would be one that would show it to have some orientation toward the satisfaction 
of some basic, rational human desires or interests, that is, the world was not sheerly indifferent to or 
perversely frustrating of human happiness. Fourth, the world is set up so that for us to accumulate 
knowledge and use our reason as vigorously as possible will be good for us, and will contribute to 
making us happy. Finally, it was assumed that there was a natural fit between the exercise of reason, the 
conditions of healthy individual human development, the demands of individuals for satisfaction of 
their needs, interests, and basic desires, and human sociability. Nature, reason, and all human goods, 
including human virtues, formed a potentially harmonious whole (Geuss 2005, 223).  
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On this reading, realism is best seen as a kind of sensibility which expresses disquiet about the 
character of contemporary moral and political philosophy given its proclivity toward wishful 
thinking of one kind or another. Hence, ¶WREHDUHDOLVW«LVWRDVVXPHDFHUWDLQDWWLWXGHWRZDUGV
the world, to focus on the most salient dimensions of a given situation, whether or not they 
FRQILUP WR RXU SUHIHUHQFHV RU GHVLUHV· (Bell 2009, 1). While it is not obvious how this ethical 
commitment should inform political theory, this is the central question that guides the most 
interesting realist work of the present.4 One of its key resulting commitments, however, is that 
SROLWLFDOSKLORVRSKHUVPXVW¶ORFDWHWKHOHYHOVRIPRUDODPELWLRQZKLFKWKH\HVSRXVHZLWKLQWKHLU
best causal understanding of the KXPDQ ZRUOG DV WKLV LV· DV WKLV SUHYHQWV WKHP ¶IURP
subordinating their understanding of how it really is to the importunities of their own projective 
GHVLUHV· (Dunn 1990, 196). This does not lead realists to deny that the possible is not given by the 
actual (Rawls 2002, 12). However, instead of prioritising a conception of Kantian faith (Rawls 
1996, lx) which assumes an idealized and tractable human nature by postulating an hopeful 
account of how morally motivated democratic citizens might act in a favourable situations, realists 
insist that our beliefs about achievability should be grounded in a resolutely historical and 
sociological understanding drawing on the concrete lessons we have learned about how human 
beings are in fact likely to act in various institutional settings. 
Third, rather than articulating (purportedly) general and abstract moral theories and 
seeking to apply them, realists hold that political DUJXPHQWV PXVW EHJLQ ¶IURP ZKHUH D JLYHQ
SROLWLFDOFRPPXQLW\LV·*DOVWRQ 2010, 396) because we cannot illuminatingly answer the political 
question ² ¶:KDWVKRXOGZHGR"·² by elaborating our favoured utopian ideals, values or virtues 
and imagining an empowered agent who can enact whatever we please (IBWD, 58). To this end, 
although realists do not deny that political arguments will express normative commitments they 
                                                 
4 That is, the commitment to unmasking the ways in which our hopes and aspirations ² our ways of reconciling 
RXUVHOYHVWRWKH¶VKHHULQGLIIHUHQFH·RIWKHZRUOG ² are often modes of a kind of wishful thinking or self-deception. 
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reject the insistence that these must be set out as an ¶ideal theory·. It is this under-examined 
aspect of political realism which I seek to make explicit in this article, beginning by examining 
Bernard :LOOLDPV·VZRUNRQOLEHUW\ and then generalising from this as an instructive example of 
realist theorising.5   
2. Thinking realistically about liberty 
7KH VWDUWLQJ SRLQW RI :LOOLDPV·V HVVD\ LV WKDW ZKDW SX]]OHV DQG concerns us about ethical and 
SROLWLFDOLGHDV¶LVWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKRVHLGHDV«DVDYDOXHIRUXVLQRXUZRUOG·DQGWKDWZH
ZLOOQRWXQGHUVWDQGWKHPXQOHVV¶ZHXQGHUVWDQGZKDWZHZDQWWKHYDOXHWRGRIRUXV² what we, 
now, need it to be in shaping our own institutions and practices·IBWD, 75). As answers to that 
question must move beyond the domain of first-order moral argument, political philosophy must 
be impure LQ WKH VHQVH WKDW ¶PDWHULDOV IURP QRQ-philosophical sources ² an involvement with 
history or the social sciences, for instance ² are likely to play a more than illustrative part in the 
DUJXPHQW·PHD, 155).6 
Political values such as liberty and justice have a thin universal element as they relate to 
universally shared human experiences. To wit, the core of liberty is primitive freedom (IBWD, 79), 
WKH ¶VLPSOH LGHD RI EHLQJ XQREVWUXFWHG LQ GRLQJ ZKDW \RX ZDQW E\ VRPH IRUP RI KXPDQO\
LPSRVHG FRHUFLRQ· ZKLOH WKH FRUH RI MXVWLFH OLHV ¶LQ VXFK WKLQJV DV D ORVV WKDW GHPDQGV
recompense, or a goRG WKDW QHHGV WR EH VKDUHG· MSH, 138). Yet at this primitive level these 
values are highly indeterminate. More determinate conceptions ¶LQYROYH D FRPSOH[ KLVWRULFDO
                                                 
5 Hence on my reading the most celebrated contemporary arguments in favour of realism in political theory should 
be seen as deeply suggestive musings on how we can philosophically investigate politics once we adopt the kind of 
attitude described. This does not mean that we cannot speak meaningfully of the realist critique of political moralism 
but it does mean that we should not expect to construct a fully-fledged alternative realist theory of politics in the 
sense of a set of discrete methodological premises and conclusions that we can apply to the same set of questions 
that animate much political moralism and which can be affirmed on doctrinal grounds (on this point see also Sagar 
forthcoming, 14). Yet while this is not a grand system ² as these anti-moralist commitments can be distinguished 
and one can endorse different strands without committing to the others ² there are affinities between them and 
aspects of the first and second commitments will play a role in the arguments that follow. I make no apology for 
this.  
6 Given that Williams sees philosophy as a ¶humanistic discipline· (PHD, 180 ² 199) when he adopts the pure vs. 
impure designation he is not signalling approval or claiming that it is only by eschewing engagement with ¶non-
philosophical sources· that one can attain pure philosophical understanding. If philosophy is a humanistic discipline 
impure materials from ¶non-philosophical sources· are essential aids to philosophical understanding rather than 
malignant sources of contamination.    
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GHSRVLWDQGZHZLOOQRWXQGHUVWDQG WKHPXQOHVVZHJUDVSVRPHWKLQJRI WKDWGHSRVLW·EHFDXVH
what liberty or justice ¶KDVYDULRXVO\EHFRPHDQGZKDWZHQRZQHHGLWWREHPXVWEHDIXQFWLRQ
RIDFWXDOKLVWRU\·IBWD, 75²6). This is why political philosophers must not attempt to define, 
but to construct, a political conception of liberty from the non-political conception of freedom.    
Primitive freedom points us in the direction of politics because when we are restricted 
from doing something by the intentional activities of others this often causes resentment and if 
WKLVLV¶Qot to express itself in more conflict, non-cooperation, and dissolution of social relations, 
an authoritative determination is needed of whose activities VKRXOGKDYHSULRULW\· IBWD, 82). 
When such an authoritative source deploys coercion, questions of its legitimacy arise.7 However, 
primitive freedom is not a political value, but rather a proto-political concept, EHFDXVH ¶QRRQHFDQ
intelligibly make a claim against others simply on the ground that the activities of others restrict 
his primitive freedom·: this is ¶WKHVWDUWRIWKHTXDUUHOQRWDFODLPWRLWVVROXWLRQ·IBWD, 83). If 
claims to a loss of liberty are to be taken seriously then they must be socially presentable, where 
this means that they are consistent with accepting a legitimate political order. Complaining that 
\RXU OLEHUW\KDVEHHQ UHVWULFWHG LI \RXDUHRXWODZHG IURPVWHDOLQJ\RXUQHLJKERXU·VSURSHUW\ LV
not a socially presentable claim. By contrast ¶DQREMHFWLRQWRWKHRSHUDWLRQVRI)UDQFRRU-DPHV
II was a socially presentable claim: one could, and most objectors did, accept that these rulers 
VKRXOG EH UHSODFHG E\ VRPH RWKHU UXOHUV DQG PRUH JHQHUDOO\ WKH\ DFFHSWHG D VWDWH V\VWHP·
(IBWD, 120). Social presentability does not ensure that we agree from an impartial perspective 
that the activity complained about should desist ² but it is a precondition of us taking complaints 
about a loss of liberty seriously.  
So how can we responsibly claim that our liberty has been restricted? Williams does not 
think that utopian discourses about liberty are analytically or definitionally incoherent, but holds that 
                                                 
7 )RU:LOOLDPV·V DFFRXQWRI WKe nature of political legitimacy see IBWD, 1 ² 17. Critical discussions include Hall 
(forthcoming), Jubb (forthcoming) and Sleat (2010). For a conceptual defence of the realist claim that legitimacy is 
more important than, or prior to, justice see Rossi (2)RUGLVFXVVLRQVRIKRZ:LOOLDPV·VSROLWLFVUHODWHVWRKLV
thought as a whole see Hall (2014) and Sagar (forthcoming).  
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WKH\ DUH ¶REOLTXHO\ UHODWHG WR DUJXPHQWV DERXW OLEHUW\ ZH ILQG LQ RXU ZRUOG· EHFDXVH ¶WKH
comparisons they invite with the actual, do not do much for the more specific construction of 
OLEHUW\DVDYDOXHIRUXV·IBWD, 90).8 We must consider ZKDWVRPHRQH¶QRZDQGDURXQGKHUH·
could reasonably resent as a loss of liberty, and when we do this  
The question of the form of society that is possible for us becomes relevant. From this perspective, a 
practice is not a limitation of liberty if it is necessary for there to be any state at all. But it is also not a 
loss of liberty if it is necessary for the functioning of society as we can reasonably imagine it working 
DQG VWLOO EHLQJ ¶RXU· VRFLHW\ 7KXV ZKLOH VRPH IRUFH DQG WKUHDWV RI IRUFH DQG VRPH LQVWLWXWLRQDO
VWUXFWXUHV ZKLFK LPSRVH GLVDGYDQWDJH RQ SHRSOH ZLOO FRXQW DV OLPLWLQJ SHRSOH·V OLEHUW\ EHLQJ 
prevented from getting what I want through economic competition will not, except in exceptional 
FDVHV7KDW LV EHFDXVHFRPSHWLWLRQ LV FHQWUDO WRPRGHUQFRPPHUFLDO VRFLHW\·V IXQFWLRQLQJ (Williams 
2009, 200).  
 
We should accordingly DFFHSW WKDW ¶PRGHUQLW\ is a basic category of social and hence political 
understanding, and so a politically useful construction of liberty for us should take the most 
JHQHUDOFRQGLWLRQVRIPRGHUQLW\DVJLYHQ·IBWD, 90). Reasonable disagreement about the forms 
that modern society can take is possible, but this does not problematize the idea that socially 
presentable constructions of liberty must be curtailed by such considerations. Therefore, 
although one can complain of a cost in freedom if one is obstructed from doing what one wants 
by any form of human coercion, it does not always follow that such claims deserve to be taken 
seriously in politics. Utopian complaints may aim to show up the prejudices of conventional 
opinion but the key question we need to ask of such claims is whether they rely on a conception 
of politics which is (IBWD, 93) ¶a fantasy, either in general or in relation to [our] historical 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV·and because OLEHUW\ LVDSROLWLFDOYDOXH ¶WKHGLVWDQFHRIWKDWSRVVLEOHZRUOG IURP
the actual world must be measured in terms of political considerations of relevance and practical 
intelligibility· (IBWD, 92).   
Williams expresses this thought in terms of realism EHFDXVH¶DIRUPRIOLEHUW\WKDWFRXOGQRW
be offered by the state is an entirely unrealistic basis of objection, and the limitation to the 
conditions of modernity implies a further step towards a realistic political positiRQ RU FODLP· 
                                                 
8 Here it is worth noting the similarity of :LOOLDPV·V claim that while imagining oneself as Kant at the Court of King 
Arthur and iQIRUPLQJSDVWVRFLHWLHVDERXW WKHLU IDLOLQJV LVQRW ¶PHDQLQJOHVV· LWGRHVQRWKHOSXV WRXQGHUVWDQG WKH
politically significant issues of the present (IBWD, 10).   
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(IBWD, 92). The basic thought, then, is that we cannot clarify the nature of various political 
values in any meaningful manner before we consider the historical and political question of what 
WKHLU HODERUDWLRQ UHTXLUHV ¶QRZ DQG DURXQG KHUH·9 Henceforth, I will refer to this idea as the 
¶realism constraint·. For Williams, it functions as an arbiter of arguments that deserve to be taken 
seriously both by those to whom they are addressed, and by the agent making the argument if 
they are being honest about what they can sincerely expect others to see as making some 
recognizable claim upon them.    
 
3. Making Sense of the Realism Constraint  
:LOOLDPV·VHQGRUVHPHQWRI WKH ¶realism constraint· is controversial as many scholars hold 
that because political theory is a normative enterprise it must not be constrained by 
considerations about how the world currently is, because doing so comes at the unacceptable 
cost of failing to rigorously consider how it ought to be. His realist account of political 
construction therefore goes against the mainstream, or orthodoxy, of contemporary political 
theory by rejecting the idea that political theory must begin with the articulation of an ideal 
ethical theory, because if it does not then the practical DGYLFHLWRIIHUVZLOO ¶QHFHVVDULO\· lack the 
right kind of aim (Rawls 1996, 285, see also Rawls 1971, 8). Ideal theory is considered necessary, 
because without it we cannot adequately evaluate existing states of affairs by noting how they fall 
short of the morally ideal, and as a result cannot engage in rightly guided political reform.   
Contemporary defences of this broad position concerning where political theorising must 
begin and what it ought to take into account when so doing come in a number of forms, and 
                                                 
9 %HFDXVH WKHSUHFRQGLWLRQVRISROLWLFDO IUHHGRP ¶YDU\ZLWKGLIIHUHQW VRFLDO IRUPDWLRQV· :LOOLDPV LQVLVWV WKDW ¶WKH
social requirements in terms of which an expression is viable in one set of historical conditions may make it a 
GLVDVWHULQDQRWKHU·MSH, 137). To this end he is sceptical about attempting to resurrect public-spirited conceptions 
of republicanism to make sense of political liberty in modernity, in part because here and now participatory 
GHPRFUDF\¶FDQRQO\VSHFLRXVO\EHUHSUHVHQWHGLQ.DQWLDQ and Rousseauian terms as either expressions of autonomy 
or of self-JRYHUQPHQW· IBWD, 16). Of course, this diagnosis of the prospects of elaborating a suitably realistic 
conception of republican liberty can be challenged and I take no stand on its accurac\KHUH+RZHYHU:LOOLDPV·V
scepticism illustrates the sorts of ¶impure· considerations such an account would have to incorporate if it were to 
flesh out a conception of liberty in a suitably realistic way.         
9 
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there are important distinctions between them. On the one hand a group of thinkers influenced 
by the work of G.A. Cohen refuse to accept the significance of the sorts of facts Williams draws 
to our attention when we think about the nature of political values tout court, because they insist 
that truths about any value are insensitive to factual claims about how the world is (Cohen 2008; 
Swift and Stemplowska 2012, 384; Hamlin and Stemplowska 2012, 55). If we incorporate 
VRPHWKLQJOLNHWKH¶UHDOLVPFRQVWUDLQW·ZHZLOOVXOO\RXUQRUPDWLYHLQTXLULHVZLWKDVHt of morally 
nonideal facts and therefore risk coming to accept the world as it is. Thus, where Williams sees 
economic ¶FRPSHWLWLRQDVLQWHJUDOWRRXUVRFLDOV\VWHP·IBWD, 91) and insists that our political 
construction should hold that economic competition in something like a Zero-sum game will not 
OLPLW D SHUVRQ·V OLEHUW\ DGYRFDWHV RI WKH &RKHQLWH SRVLWLRQ DUH OLNHO\ WR FODLP WKDW while the 
integral role of economic competition may influence the rules-of-regulation we should adopt to 
best approximate the mix of ¶fundamental· values we want to achieve, it does not itself have any 
bearing on the correct conception of any value. To uncover the correct conception we must 
instead HQJDJHLQ¶abstract, pure, context-IUHHSKLORVRSK\·(Swift 2008, 382).10   
David Miller objects to the Cohenite position because he claims that such a focus on the 
logically possible at the expense of the politically realistic leaves us in the position of having 
nothing to do but lament ¶WKHVL]HRIWKHJDSWKDWXQDYRLGDEO\H[ists between the ideals it defends 
DQG WKH DFWXDO FRQGLWLRQV RI KXPDQ OLIH· ZLWK WKH UHVXOW WKDW ¶WKH LGHDV DUH GUDLQHG RI WKHLU
SUDFWLFDO IRUFH· 0LOOHU , 213, 237). Realists are likely to share 0LOOHU·V UHOXFWDQFH about 
mistaking such lamentation with worthwhile political argument, but judging the philosophical 
force of this aversion is difficult. John Dunn, who shares many of the same central concerns as 
Williams, and which elucidate realist WKHEDFNJURXQGRI WKRXJKW DWZRUN FODLPV WKDW ¶SROLWLFal 
theory is the theory of what to do about what is there, not the theory of what, were we God, we 
would have brought about or merely what we, while not being God, wRXOGJUHDWO\SUHIHU·'XQQ
                                                 
10 For this reason Cohenities are likely to contend that theorising in this way engenders adaptive preference 
formation, D ¶SURFHVV LQZKLFKDSHUVRQFRPHV WRSUHIHU$WR% MXVWEHFDXVH$ LVDYDLODEOHDQG% LVQRW· &RKHQ
1995, 253). 
10 
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1980, 291). Yet it is hard to conceive of any argument that could judiciously prove that political 
theory really has this purpose. As a result, realists should perhaps give up on arguing their 
opponents into realism on pain of rational consistency or the fundamental incoherence of 
political moralism and/or ideal theory, at least from starting premises both sides accept.11  
It is, however, worth stressing that there is no reason why realists must grant the moralist 
claim that theirs is the default position. As we have seen, Williams denies that the sort of 
abstract, pure and context-free philosophy Cohen and Swift endorse leads to a determinate 
conception of any political value except the ¶primitive· concern they speak to; beyond this the 
sorts of practical concerns I discussed the Section 2 come into play, including when we think 
about political values like liberty, the practical concerns of politics. If the content that primitive 
values come to hold when they are elaborated in history does not divert us from their true nature 
but instead gives them any determinate meaning, the idea that our political values should track 
the real world is not best understood as a species of adaptive preference formation but merely of 
intellectual seriousness.12 Consider the value of privacy: :LOOLDPV·VSRVLWLRQJLYHVFUHGHQFHWRWKH
very plausible suggestion that rather than seeing the digital revolution of the last few decades as 
confronting us with a new set of contingent facts (Instagram, selfies, a propensity toward 
narcissistic exhibitionism etc.) which our commitment to an abstract conception of privacy must 
surmount, we should instead recognise that such technological, social, and psychological 
developments are transforming our very understanding of the value of privacy and what such a 
commitment entails personally and politically. Continuing to make sense of privacy as a value 
                                                 
11 The dispute between realists and moralists about how to do political theory has its basis in a mix of metaethical 
disagreement and opposing conceptions of the relation between value judgement and collective action which 
generate basic dispositional disagreement about what kinds of intellectual inquiries are worth taking seriously. For 
instance, :LOOLDPV·VHQGRUVHPHQWRIUHDOLVPLQSROLWLFDOWKHRU\H[SUHVVHVKLVKLJKHU-order commitments about which 
kind of intellectual enquiries matter, which is significantly at odds with most moralist political philosophy given his 
rejection of the philosophical presuppositions RI WKH ¶PRUDOLW\ V\VWHP· (ELP, 174 ² 196). If one continues to 
endorse such presuppositions, or something close to them, as many political moralists appear to do, this will 
QHFHVVDULO\DIIHFWRQH·VYLHZVDERXWKRZWRGRSROLWLFDOWKHRU\ 
12 Pippin helpfully describes the underlying idea in the following terms: ¶WKH LVVXH RI WKH ¶actual· content of any 
principle, when it is applied and asserted in the public domain, when it is opposed by others and directed towards 
the use of coercive restraint on others, is not a secondary or supplementary issue, does not involve a mere 
unfortunate compromise with an imperfect world. It is in such contestations and in the midst of historical change 
WKDWWKHFRQFHSWFDQEHVDLGWRKDYHDQ\GHWHUPLQDWHFRQWHQWDWDOO·3LSSLQ 
11 
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therefore requires an on-going process of renegotiation and reflection on the developments that 
continue to shape our world.  
Williams is not advocating the replacement of ethics with history, as Ronald Dworkin has 
claimed (see the ¶discussion· in Dworkin, Lilla and Silvers ed. 2001, 124).  Although realistically 
possible states of affairs are an arbiter of serious political argument, we still have to argue about 
how the world should be and various ethical considerations will play a role in these debates. The 
point is that while political moralists may insist that they are uninterested in such ¶political· 
considerations as they claim to focus on the unsullied moral principles that ought to underwrite 
politics, Williams insists that we must embrace the impurity of political theory by asking if it is 
interesting or purposeful  to imagine a social world where a constitutive feature of our lives ² like 
economic competition ² is not central, instead of simply interrogating our (idiosyncratic) moral 
intuitions about a range of real and imaginary cases. While some (especially Cohen 2008, Estlund 
2011 and Swift 2008) may find this acceptance of certaiQ ¶JLYHQV· PRUDOO\ FRPSURPLVLQJ they 
DSSHDUWRKROGRQWRDZRUOGYLHZZKLFKLV¶QRW\HWWKRURXJKO\GLVHQFKDQWHG·PHD, 138) by the 
failure of the search for an absolute perspective from which we can ultimately justify how we 
should go on; a point outside our politics and history from which we can legislate how we should 
live.13 If we agree with Williams that the prospect of such a vindication is doomed ² that we are, 
as it were, always working from within ² we are less likely to be concerned by the idea that 
incorporating various historical and political constraints runs the risk of causing us to 
conservatively accept the world as it is. Rather, we might defensibly think that it is the first step 
towards responsibly thinking about how it should be, especially if we grant that we can secure 
confidence in our values and commitments without such an external foundation (ELP, 170-71 
and Hall 2014).   
                                                 
13 Williams and Geuss are adamant that such an external foundation cannot be had. See Sagar 2014 for an excellent 
discussion of this aspect of WilliamV·VWKRXJKW 
12 
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At this point Rawlsian theorists may point out that they also take issue with the Cohenite 
suggestion that political theory can proceed without adopting a determinate historical starting 
point14 and that they insist that political theory must be realistically utopian by concerning itself 
ZLWK WKH ¶OLPLWV RI SUDFWLFDO SROLWLFDO SRVVLELOLW\· 5DZOs 2001, 4). Although this muddies the 
realism vs. moralism story somewhat, significant differences between Rawls·V DQG :LOOLDPV·V
approaches exist because Rawls insists that as justice is the first virtue of social institutions ¶WKH
SROLWLFDOSKLORVRSKHU·V ILUVW MRE«LV WR UHILQHDQGDUJXH IRU DQ LGHDORI MXVWLFH· 6LPPRQV
36). Such an overarching ideal is needed to ensure that our more concrete political arguments are 
directed toward the right end and, as an ideal, is not constrained by the sorts of considerations 
the realism constraint draws our attention to. Rawls accordingly holds that political theory·VPRVW
fundamental task is to articulate a theory of justice as full-compliance, because if we lack such a 
regulative idea ² which models perfection by envisaging a situation in which all the obligations 
citizens owe to one another are discharged (Jubb 2012, 231)15 ² we will not be able to understand 
the extent to which our politics is tragic, DQG¶LQQRWXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKDWWUDJHG\ZHZLOOWHQGWR
make PLVWDNHV DERXW ZKDW LV DFWXDOO\ GHVLUDEOH LQ WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHV RI WUDJHG\ « >EHFDXVH@
unless we know how people are being mistreated, then we are likely to continue to mistreat 
WKHP·-XEE-9).  
However, there are at least two objections realists can make against the Rawlsian view 
here.16 First, they can challenge 5DZOV·V HSLVWHPRORJLFDO FRPPLWPHQWV )RU H[DPSOH Jiven his 
belief in value pluralism, Williams holds that we can only pursue our values and commitments by 
intuitively balancing their respective claims. If we understand pluralism as Williams does and 
                                                 
14 5DZOV·V WDON RI UHFRQFLOLDWLRQ LV LQGLFDWLYH RI WKLV  . Such contextualism is especially evident in Rawls-
inspired practice-dependent approaches such as those developed by Sangiovanni 2008 and Jubb 2014.  
15 Because justice is a matter of rightly ordering the basic structure of society, non-compliance merely signals that 
some people are violating their natural duty to support and comply with just institutions (Rawls 1971, 115). Such 
facts should not contaminate the attempt to construct an ideal theory of justice as they merely concede ground to 
our moral imperfection.   
16 Rawls also claims that such an approach is realistically utopian because given favourable circumstances, our 
understanding of moral psychology and democratic politics does not rule out the idea that a just basic structure 
could achieve stability for the right reasons. (For a useful discussion of favourable circumstances see Swift and 
Stemplowska 2012, 376). Realists are likely to object to this for the kinds of reasons I canvassed when discussing the 
second aspect of the realist critique in Section 1. However, I leave aside this dispute here.     
13 
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FRQFXUUHQWO\ KROG WKDW ¶PRUDO FRQIOLFWV DUH QHLWKHU V\VWHPDWLFDOO\ DYRLGDEOH QRU DOO VROXEOH
ZLWKRXWUHPLQGHU·PS, 179) there is little reason to think that we could, even in theory, imagine a 
world in which all the moral obligations citizens have toward each other were met, in part 
because pluralists deny that key values can be lexically ordered and justice given priority (Galston 
2010, 407). If we therefore follow Williams and refuse to buy into the simplifying assumptions of 
the ¶morality system·, there is OLWWOHUHDVRQWRFRQWLQXHWRHQGRUVHWKH¶LGHDOWKDWKXPDQH[LVWHQFH
FDQEHXOWLPDWHO\ MXVW· ELP, 195). 7RWKLVHQG LIUHDOLVWVDUHSOXUDOLVWV LQ:LOOLDPV·s sense they 
FDQUHMHFW5DZOV·VDUJXPHQWfor the priority of ideal theory of justice on epistemic grounds.17 
Secondly, realists deny that we need such a regulative idea to guide us here and now: just 
because we cannot have certainty about what perfection demands, it does not follow that we 
cannot pick out injustices that ought to be remedied (Sen 2010). There is no reason to believe 
that such an anti-theoretical approach must engender a worrying complacency toward the status 
quo (contra Nussbaum 2000).  If we recall that our ways of life and our ethical and political 
concepts have a history, WKHUH LV OLWWOH WHPSWDWLRQ WR DVVXPH WKDW RXU SROLWLFDO ZRUOG ¶LV D
saWLVIDFWRULO\ IXQFWLRQLQJZKROH· DV ¶VRPHZLGHO\ DFFHSWHGSDUWVRI LWPD\ VWDQGFRQGHPQHG LQ
the light RISHUIHFWO\SODXVLEOHH[WUDSRODWLRQVRIRWKHUSDUWV·IBWD, 36²7). Working from within, 
we can therefore UHLQWHUSUHW ¶ZKDW LV HWKLFDOO\ VLJQLILFDQW VR DV WR JLYH D FULWLTXH RI H[LVWLQJ
LQVWLWXWLRQV FRQFHSWLRQV SUHMXGLFHV DQG SRZHUV· IBWD, 37).18 Conflict between our moral 
VHQWLPHQWVLVD¶KLVWRULFDOO\VRFLDOO\DQGSUREDEO\SV\FKRORJLFDOO\FRQGLWLRQHGSKHQRPHQRQ·² a 
result of the pluralistic nature of modernity and the cultural changes that have accompanied it ² 
and it is not a rational requirement that it be avoided (PHD, 162).19 Rather than attempting 
                                                 
17 While I aPQRWLQDSRVLWLRQWRYLQGLFDWH:LOOLDPV·VFRQFHSWLRQRIYDOXHSOXUDOLVPKHUH, it is worth acknowledging 
that this is a plausible base on which to criticise Rawls from a realist perspective, as Jubb appears to accept in more 
recent work: Jubb forthcoming, 7.  
18 Williams accordingly rejects the communitarian label because it suggests a preference for homogeneity and 
XQUHIOHFWLYHFRQILGHQFHZKLFK UXQV ¶WKHULVNRIEHLQJQRWPHUHO\ LQWHOOHFWXDOO\HPSW\DQGXQUHDOLVWLFEXWSDWKHWLF
SUHWHQWLRXVHYDVLYHRUGHFHLWIXODVZHOO·IBWD, 44 see also SN, 162, 166). 
19 Williams constantly argued that the authority of theory must be questioned because it cannot explain by what right 
it legislates the moral sentiments (ML[:KLOHDWKHRULVWPD\VD\WKDWKLVRUKHUDFFRXQWLV¶PXFKPRUHHOHJDQWRU
14 
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(unsuccessfully) to resolve such conflicts theoretically, the most useful thing philosophical 
reflection may do is to explain why they have a basis in various sentiments we hold dear (PHD, 
164).  
The preceding analysis enables us to see that realism is not the same thing as nonideal 
theory on either the Cohenite or Rawlsian sense of what that entails, even though realists and 
nonideal theorists both insist that political theorising must be constrained by factual claims. For 
Williams the formulation of a political value is context-bound, which means that various realist 
concerns about the nature of our politics and historical context are relevant to the theoretical 
task of constructing our political values. However, it does not follow that realistic political theory 
is merely an exercise in applying feasibility constraints to an abstract moral ideal to make it 
achievable here and now. This cannot be what Williams is urging precisely because he denies that 
¶abstract, context-free philosophy· can provide a serviceable account of such ideals in the first 
place.20 Of course, our political arguments will be expressive of our basic normative 
commitments but there is no reason to endorse the orthodox claim that they have to be set out in 
an ¶ideal theory·. We all have pre-volitional or pre-reflective concerns; commitments to actual 
states of affairs and courses of action among actual people which will give our prescriptive 
political arguments their purpose.21 While philosophical enquiry can help us to understand them 
better, there is not a great deal it can do to either systematise them or justify them in the ways 
political moralists typically desire.22 If we take seriously the idea that we must make sense to those 
whom we speak, there is little reason to assume this activity cannot guide political action. As a 
result, realists ¶should not concede to abstract ethical theory its claim to provide the only 
LQWHOOHFWXDOVXUURXQGLQJVIRUVXFKLGHDV·ELP, 198).    
                                                                                                                                                        
LW·VVLPSOHURUZLWK IHZHUSULQFLSOHVRU LWKDVDFHUWDLQUDWLRQDOVWUXFWXUH,VD\VRZKDW",·PQRW OLYLQJP\OLIH LQ
RUGHUWRH[HPSOLI\DPDWKHPDWLFDOWKHRU\·:LOOLDPVE 
20 For further discussion of the relationship between realism and nonideal theory see Rossi and Sleat 2014, 690-91 
and Sleat, forthcoming.        
21 For more on these internal reasons or pre-volitional commitments see Williams 1981, 101 -114 and Pippin 2010, 
27²29. 
22 7KLV LV WKH FHQWUDOPHVVDJH RI :LOOLDPV·V WKHVLV UHJDUGLQJ WKH LQDELOLW\ RI SKLlosophical enquiry to conclusively 
DQVZHU6RFUDWHV·TXHVWLRQ ¶how should I live?· (ELP, passim).   
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4. Allies and Opponents 
Williams also states that a realistic conception of liberty must take the character and nature of 
political opposition seriously. He FULWLFLVHV 'ZRUNLQ·V YLHZ WKDW OLEHUWy and equality cannot 
conflict (because liberty is a matter of having a rightful claim) as ¶Lt is one datum of experience 
that people can even recognize a restriction as rightful under some political value such as equality 
RU MXVWLFH DQGQHYHUWKHOHVV UHJDUG LW DV D UHVWULFWLRQRQ OLEHUW\· IBWD, 84). If we think about 
what we need our construction of liberty to do for us we should recognise that people 
reasonably disagree about the rightful ends of political action and this problematizes 'ZRUNLQ·V
¶5RXVVHDXLDQYLHZ·WKDWPDQ\FLWL]HQVDUHVLPSO\ZURQJWRFRPSODLQWKDWYDULRXVFRHUFLYHDFWLRQV 
(e.g. the outlawing of private education) inhibit their liberty, even if such actions are justified. 
Hence, while we need to move beyond the notion of primitive freedom if we are to construct 
liberty as a political value, Williams insists that certain resentments should be taken seriously as 
genuLQHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIORVVHVLQOLEHUW\EHFDXVH¶the proposed interpretation of liberty is what we need 
in order to live in society with others who have different interpretations of equality· (IBWD, 125²6, italics in 
original). Dworkin forgets this because his image of contestation is not appropriately political:  
The on-going political framework that contains all this conflict is not given to us, as for instance, the 
institutional protocols of the Supreme Court supply an on-going framework for its decisions. We have 
to constantly reinvent the political framework ² LQSDUWWKURXJKRXUDWWLWXGHVWRRXUIHOORZFLWL]HQV«
our relation to them is not that of offering them instruction in reading a text which we believe we can 
read better than they can (IBWD, 126). 
Political arguments cannot be modelled on the interpretation of a shared moral text because this 
fails to capture both the character of political opposition and the way in which people actually 
argue for their political convictions and favoured policies the overwhelming majority of the time 
(IBWD, 12).23 Thus, instead of directing our arguments at utopian magistrates, we ought to view 
the readers of our work as WKH ¶DXGLHQFHRIDSDPSKOHW·Appropriately realistic conceptions of 
political argument must acknowledge the necessarily partisan nature of our beliefs and 
                                                 
23 While the activity of interpreting a moral text plays an important role the United States, Williams insists that even 
LQWKLVFDVHLWLVD¶PLVWDNHWRHTXDte political thought about matters of principle with thought about actual or ideal 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ·IRUWKHUHDVRQVFDQYDVVHGDERYHIBWD, 78).  
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convictions; WKH\ DUH QRW ¶DXWRQRPRXV SURGXFWV RI PRUDO UHDVRQ· EXW ¶RI SUHYLRXV KLVWRULFDO
FRQGLWLRQVDQGDQREVFXUHPL[WXUHRIEHOLHIV«SDVVLRQVLQWHUHVWVDQGVR IRUWK·IBWD, 12-13). 
This should lead us to adopt a more realistic view of our allies and opponents. While moral 
GLVDJUHHPHQW LV FKDUDFWHUL]HG ¶E\ WKHNLQGVRI UHDVRQV WKDW DUHEURXJKW WREHDURQDGHFLVLRQ·, 
SROLWLFDOGLVDJUHHPHQW¶LVLGHQWLILHGE\DILHOGRIDSSOLFDWLRQ² eventually, about what should be 
GRQHXQGHUSROLWLFDODXWKRULW\LQSDUWLFXODUWKURXJKWKHGHSOR\PHQWRIVWDWHSRZHU·:HRXJKW
WKHUHIRUH WRDFNQRZOHGJH WKDW ¶WKH UHDVRQV WKDWJR LQWRSROitical decisions and arguments that 
EHDURQWKHPPD\EHRIYDULRXVNLQGV·IBWD, 77). As a result, realistic conceptions of political 
disagreement help us to recognise that a political decision does not ¶announce that the other 
party was morally wrong, or indeed, wrong at all. What it immediately announces is that they 
KDYHORVW·IBWD, 13). Williams concludes that rather than treating our fellow citizens as moral 
interlocutors whose objections we can discount because they are intellectually mistaken, we 
should see them as losers of a political contest who may have genuine complaints (IBWD, 13). A 
realistic political theory will acknowledge that politics is shot-through with moral remainders of 
this sort (ML, 61).  
The implication for our construction of liberty is clear: we ought to think that objections 
² or at least ones which are socially presentable and satisfy the realism constraint ² should be 
treated as constraints on our theorising of liberty as a form of democratic respect EHFDXVHWKLV¶is 
a condition not only of taking seriously the idea of political opposition, but of taking our political 
RSSRQHQWVWKHPVHOYHVVHULRXVO\· IBWD, 85).24 We can generalise from these claims to a set of 
more general observations about how to do realistic political theory which are not entailed by 
:LOOLDPV·V DUJXPHQWV DERXW KRZ WR WKHRULVH OLEHUW\ UHDOLVWLFDOO\, but which have an elective 
                                                 
24 7KLV HQDEOHV XV WR UHFRJQLVH WKDW OHJLVODWLRQ VXFK DV WKH 8QLWHG .LQJGRP·V +XQWLQJ $FW RI 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunting_Act_2004), which banned the hunting of wild mammals (including foxes), 
or the Health Act of 2006 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smoking_ban_in_England), which outlawed smoking in 
HQFORVHGSODFHVRIZRUNOLPLWHGSHRSOH·s liberty by outlawing activities their opponents sincerely thought they ought 
to be free to pursue. This conceptual claim does not imply that these Acts should not have been passed because 
Williams, unlike Dworkin, does not insist that liberty is a matter of having a rightful claim. However, democratic 
UHVSHFWUHTXLUHVXVWRVHHWKHPDVLQIULQJLQJSHRSOH·VOLEHUW\ZKLFKLQWXUQLVOLNHO\WRPDNHWKHMXVWLILFDWRU\EXUGHQ
applied to such legislation more stringent.  
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affinity with them. Firstly, rather than merely lecturing our political opponents about their 
intellectual errors, we must instead engage in the difficult task of reconciling the necessarily 
partisan nature of our contributions to political debate with the democratic reasons we have for 
respecting our fellow citizens.25 For Williams the question of the attitude we should adopt 
toward our allies and opponents, and the question of when their complaints should be heeded 
and when they should not, is ultimately a matter of judgement, which cannot be determined in 
the seminar room (IBWD, 19). But the fact that it is impossible to theoretically determine 
precisely what this attitude should entail in advance of the political debates to which it applies 
does not make it any less real.   
   We can get a clearer sense of how taking political opposition and support seriously 
matters by examining Williams·V UHDVRQV IRU KROGLQJ WKDW RWKHUV· UHDFWLRQV DQG VHQWLPHQWV DUH
important philosophical considerations when we think about the character of our political values 
and concepts. This comes out in his debate with G.A. Cohen concerning the reports that were 
published as part of the %ULWLVK /DERXU 3DUW\·V 1992-1994 Commission on Social Justice, on 
which Williams served.26 In his critique of the Commission, Cohen claims the /DERXU 3DUW\·V
traditional values of community ² ¶the antimarket principle according to which I serve you not 
because of what I can get out of doing so but because you need my service· (Cohen 2011, 217) ² 
                                                 
25 Rawls is more sensitive to such concerns, which again complicates the realists vs. moralists narrative. However, 
5DZOV·VSXEOLF UHDVRQEDVHG VROXWLRQ WR WKHSUREOHPRIKRZ WR UHVSHFWFLWL]HQV· UHDVRQDEOHGLVDJUHHPHQWV FDQEH
criticised because it is incapable of giving us any direct guidance on how we should treat our political opponents 
here and now given its own idealizing assumptions (Stears and Humprey 2012, 305). More generally realists also 
deny that we need the kind of a moralised consensus Rawls seeks because they reject his understanding of stability. 
For example, Williams claims that we merely need the kind of agreement required for citizens to acquiesce with a set 
of constitutional or conventional rules that entail the avoidance of the problems of widespread social disorder (See 
Williams 1999a, 158 and IBWD, 2 fn. 2). This repudiation of Rawls has been charged with ignoring the ways in 
which stable political orders may require explicitly moralised sources of agreement (Jubb forthcoming, 11 ²14). 
HRZHYHU -XEE·V VXEVWDQWLYH SRLQWV DERXW WKH NLQGV RI MXGJHPHQWV DQG FRPSODLQWV WKDW DIIHFW WKH VWDELOLW\ RI
PRGHUQVWDWHVVWULNHPHDVEHLQJSHUIHFWO\FRPSDWLEOHZLWK:LOOLDPV·VDFFRXQW, given that solving the first political 
question is a necessary but not sufficient condition of political legitimation, because legitimate regimes must make 
sense WR WKHLU VXEMHFWV DV H[DPSOHV RI ¶DXWKRULWDWLYH RUGHU· IBWD, 10). I accordingly fail to see why realists will 
¶VWUXJJOH WR DFFRXQW· -XEE IRUWKFRPLQJ  IRU WKH ways in which modern political orders command, or fail to 
FRPPDQGSHRSOH·VDOOHJLDQFH(LWKHUZD\WKHUHOHYDQWSRLQWLVWKDWUHDOLVWVFDQUHDVRQDEO\DVNIRUFUHGLEOHHYLGHQFH
WRYLQGLFDWH5DZOV·VFODLPWKDWSROLWLFDOVWDELOLW\FDQRQO\EHDFKLHYHGE\UHsolving disputes about political authority 
via moralised agreement on constitutional essentials. Such evidence cannot be provided by the internal workings of 
the theory, however elegant it may be.   
26 See http://www.ippr.org.uk/ipprcommissions/index.asp?id=2378.   
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and equality ²  the idea that ¶WKHDPRXQWRIDPHQLW\DQGEXUGHQLQRQHSHUVRQ·VOLIH should be 
URXJKO\FRPSDUDEOH WR WKDW LQDQ\RWKHU·V· &RKHQ² had been compromised in the 
hope of greater electoral success. According to Cohen, a proper understanding of these values 
points ¶to a form of society a hundred miles from the horizon of present possibility·DQGVXFK
utopianism is ¶needed to defend every half-mile of territory gained and to mount an attempt to 
regain each bit that has been lost· (Cohen 2011, 213). It is consequently a mistake to think that 
the failure of the socialist movement to foster a widespread acceptance of its values should affect 
the question of whether or not they should be endorsed, ¶Hven if it is indeed a reason, politics 
EHLQJZKDW LW LVQRW WR WKUXVW WKHPIRUZDUGSXEOLFO\ LQ WKHLUXQYDUQLVKHG IRUP· (Cohen 2011, 
217). Similarly, in his camping trip thought experiment in Why Not Socialism? Cohen claims that 
(2009, 57) ¶WKHSULQFLSDOSUREOHP WKDW IDFHV WKH VRFLDOLVW LGHDO LV WKDWZHGRQRWNQRZKRZ WR
GHVLJQ WKH PDFKLQHU\ WKDW ZRXOG PDNH LW UXQ·, rather than the problem of the value status of 
socialism now and around here, because the salient obstacle facing socialism is the feasibility 
issue of design.27  
As Jubb notes, realists like Williams DUHKRVWLOHWR&RKHQ·Vargument because there is good 
reason to hold that the socialist SULQFLSOHRIFRPPXQLW\DSSHDOVWRD¶FRPPXQDOLW\RISXUSRVH·
which eradicates the very set of conflicts about our ends and interests which frame our politics, 
with the result that socialist ¶community· is not a coherent political value here and now (Jubb 
forthcoming, 8). The problem is not, as Cohen encourages us to think, merely RQHRI¶IHDVLELOLW\·
As I have argued elsewhere, the refusal to incorporate certain factual considerations about the 
nature of the conflicts we experience in politics is more akin to a category error. Once we 
acknowledge that our politics is, in large part, a matter of managing large-scale collective action 
problems, and ¶agree that in such scenarios different psychological traits must exist than in 
LPDJLQHG VLWXDWLRQV OLNH &RKHQ·V FDPSLQJ WULS there is reason to believe that employing such 
                                                 
27 The question, that is, of ZRUNLQJ RXW KRZ WR PDNH DQ HFRQRPLF V\VWHP UXQ E\ ¶H[SORLWLQJ KXPDQ JHQHURVLW\·
(2009, 58). 
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thought experiments as a proxy to uncover political principles is a mistake· (Hall 2013, 180). The 
insistence that our normative political arguments should begin with the acceptance of various 
factual considerations about how our world is, is not EHVWXQGHUVWRRGDVD ¶IHDVLELOLW\·FRQFHUQ 
but as expressing the more fundamental requirement that we actually address the political 
practices we claim to be concerned with.28  
Williams makes two further points in his response to Cohen which are significant. First, 
that the historical tradition that supported the value of community LQYROYHGD ¶SHFXOLDU· set of 
alliances forged in special ethos of post-war Britain, some of which were admirable but others ² 
¶[HQRSKRELD EUXWDOLW\ DQG VH[LVP· ² were not (Williams, 1997, 55). The problem Cohen 
accordingly faces is that wanting to simply resurrect this earlier outlook makes little sense 
because ¶Lt would mean giving up on the liberalisation of what was then the past fifty years and 
UHWXUQLQJWRDVLWXDWLRQWKHUHPRYDORIZKLFKWKDWYHU\RXWORRNGHPDQGHG·-XEEIRUWKFRPLQJ
9). Second, and more significantly, Williams insists that Cohen cannot understand which values 
are politically appropriate to our modern circumstances precisely because he insists that the 
UHDFWLRQVDQGVHQWLPHQWVRIRQH·VIHOORZFLWL]HQVDUHRIQo philosophical relevance to the task of 
outlining coherent conceptions of our political values. Often disappointed political philosophers 
RIIHU ¶not much more than moralising disappointment with the electors, to the effect that they 
are too greedy and self-cenWUHGWRDFFHSWRQH·VSULQFLSOHV· and when this kind of moral posturing 
takes place ¶WKHWLPHKDVFRPHWRDVNZKHWKHURQH·VSULQFLSOHVDUHSULQFLSOHVIRUWKHVHSHRSOH² 
whether indeed, they are political SULQFLSOHVDWDOO·:LOOLDPVHence, rather than merely 
lamenting the moral deficiencies of those who supported the rise of the New Right, British 
Labour Party theoreticians PXVW DFFHSW WKDW ¶RQHRI WKH OHVV HQFRXUDJLQJ H[SODQDWLRQV RI ZK\
these ideas have had an effect is that they are in a certain sense psychologically and historically 
realistic, [as] they may be seen as appealing to motives that people have and are not ashamed to 
KDYHUDWKHUWKDQWRPRWLYHVWKHPRUDOLVWVZRXOGSUHIHUWKHPWRKDYH· :LOOLDPV To 
                                                 
28 )RUIXUWKHUUHDOLVWFULWLFLVPRI&RKHQ·VDSSURDFKVHH5RVVL 
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this end, Williams urges political theorists to think about motivation realistically, especially if they 
ZDQWWRFUHGLWDEO\FODLPWKDWSHRSOH·VPRWLYDWLRQVFRXOGEHWUDQVIRUPHGXQGHUDVHWRIGLIIHUHQW
institutions. This does not require us to take motives as fixed; no realist should think that for the 
very obvious reason that they are not. However, it counsels us to avoid the temptation of merely 
imputing to the imaginary agents who populate our models motives that will best secure the 
political goals we want to achieve. Such argumentation lies somewhere between the vices of 
wishful thinking and self-deception. Because Cohen·V methodological commitments preclude 
him from taking the realism constraint, as well as considerations about the real motivations of 
his fellow citizens, seriously, Williams insists that there is little reason to avoid the conclusion 
that he is simply RIIHULQJXV¶DWULSGRZQ0HPRU\/DQH· (1997, 56).  
This is not a fully worked-out account of precisely how the sentiments and motivations of 
our fellow citizens ought to affect the activity of political theorising, but it is suggestive. For one 
thing, it exorcises the suggestion that taking our fellow citizens motivations seriously is an issue 
of secondary philosophical importance. Considering the real motives people have, rather than 
the ones we wish that they had, is relevant because it can stop us from mistaking nostalgic 
lamentation, utopian imagining, or the ecstasy of sanctimony29 with coherent political argument. 
Politics necessarily exhibits a diverse range of psychological dispositions, attitudes and real 
motivations and the academic investigation of politics (both descriptive and normative) requires 
us take them into account. Consequently, it is not clear that imagining what we would do if we 
were organising a camping-trip, or in the position of a maximally empowered Utopian 
magistrate, even warrants the name political theory/philosophy because it not only requires us to 
wish away the fact of political opposition (itself a basic constitutive feature of our politics) but 
also contains within it the (at the very least suspect, and quite possibly indecent) desire to 
configure the psychology of every person on the planet so that they would act as we please. As 
Raymond Geuss QRWHV ¶SROLWLFV LV KLVWRULFDOO\ ORFDWHG LW KDV WRGRZLWKKXPDQV LQWHUDFWLQJ LQ
                                                 
29 7RXVHDZRQGHUIXOO\HYRFDWLYHSKUDVHRI3KLOLS5RWK·V 
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LQVWLWXWLRQDOFRQWH[WVWKDWFKDQJHRYHUWLPHDQGWKHVWXG\RISROLWLFVPXVWUHIOHFWWKLVIDFW·
13). For this reason, political theorists should be more comfortable than many moralists appear 
to be with the idea that their prescriptions will necessarily be contingent on the character of 
PRGHUQ VRFLDO IRUPDWLRQV DQGSHRSOH·V sentiments and motivations. For ¶Thucydidean realists· 
this is simply a matter of taking the disenchantment of the world seriously.      
This realistic account of political construction also counsels us to view the people we 
address as agents with concrete identities and disparate projects who need to be convinced and 
motivated to act as they are rather than as recalcitrant impediments toward the achievement of our 
favoured philosophical theory, or a particular set of distributive principles. The motivations, 
goals and commitments of our fellow citizens matter because ¶ZKHWKHURXUWKRXJKWVHYHQPDke 
SROLWLFDO VHQVH GHSHQGV WR DQ LQGHILQLWH GHJUHH RQ RWKHU SHRSOH·V DFWLRQV· IBWD, 25). If we 
genuinely want to move people to act in a particular way we must take seriously the need to 
speak to them in terms that they can embrace, a reminder which ties LQZLWK:LOOLDPV·Vview that 
ethical and political arguments will fail to guide action if they offer the sort of conventional 
philosophical theory which systematises ethical thought and reduces it to some basic principles. 
Realist political theory requires an imaginative grasp on what might actually make sense to people 
here and now. As such, this requires its practitioners to avoid the temptation of merely preaching 
to their audience.30   
These thoughts come together to buttress the claim that the sort of moral imagining many 
political moralists favour is, if not guilty on the category error front, is at best nothing more than 
SROLWLFDOO\ GHIHDVLEOH PRUDO LPDJLQLQJ WKDW KDV QRW \HW ¶FURVV>HG@ WKH WKUHVKROG RI RIIHULQJ D
VHULRXVSROLWLFDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQ·IBWD, 92). This is because political values must be constructed 
in such a way that they have purchase in the unique historical and political situation in which we 
actually find ourselves, alongside other morally imperfect people. Once we grant the coherent 
                                                 
30 Archetypal cases of moralism LQYROYH¶WKHLQVLVWHQFHWKDWDJLYHQSHUVRQLVZURQJGLVFRQQHFWHGIURPDQ\SRVVLEOH
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIKRZLWFRPHVDERXWWKDWKHLVZURQJ·DVWKLV¶WHQGVWROHave the commentator entirely outside that 
SHUVRQSUHDFKLQJDWKLP·ELP, 241 endnote 16). 
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basis of this methodological claim about how we should do political theory, there is little reason 
to hold that taking the facts of political opposition or support seriously mistakenly elevates an 
issue of opportunistic politics to one of philosophical or theoretical importance. Political 
institutions claim authority over all subject to their power, and our political values, as such, are 
meant to help us to think about how they could be better ordered in the light of that claim. As a 
result, when we do political theory we cannot be solipsists31 and the issues Williams argues we 
should incorporate into our construction of political values matter deeply when we think about 
how this aspiration might be made good, even if they are not the final answer. But the message is 
clear: if political theory is to live up to the first part of its billing, it had better avoid the 
temptation to separate questions of ¶pure principle· from such considerations.   
 
5. Conclusion 
I KDYHGUDZQRQ:LOOLDPV·VZRUNRQOLEHUW\WRargue that realists can offer a more constructive 
account of how we should think normatively about politics than much of the current debate 
acknowledges. Williams·V endorsement of what I have called the ¶UHDOLVPFRQVWUDLQW·, alongside 
his claims about the significance and character of political opposition and real motivation, 
suggest that the elaboration of a political value must not be conceived in terms of the application 
of a pre-political moral value to the political sphere. There is not, as it were, a domain of value 
alongside a separate domain of politics, where the nonideal principles, or rules-of-regulation, that 
we adopt endeavour to be the best application of our ideal theory, or fundamental fact-
insensitive principles, given the facts we must negotiate ² facts which, conceived as such, merely 
either impede or assist the political activity of moral realisation. Political thinking about ideals is 
rather an attempt to make sense of what a value can mean for us ¶QRZDQGDURXQGKHUH· and 
because there is no clean split between principle and politics in the way the moralists claim, we 
                                                 
31 ,ERUURZWKLVZD\RIIUDPLQJVXFKDFRPSODLQWIURPDQXQSXEOLVKHGSDSHURI'DYLG6FKPLGW]·V 
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constantly have to judge how facts of politics affect our political values and vice versa. 
Therefore, unlike nonideal theorists, realists like Williams are not merely working around the 
edges of what Hamlin and Stemplowska have called the ¶IHDVLELOLW\IURQWLHU· or telling 
us to lower our normative aims (Swift and Stemplowska 2012, 382 and Valentini 2012, 660). 
They are rather challenging the received wisdom about relationship between morally ¶purified· 
regulative ideas and political practice inherent in most contemporary normative political theory. 
If this position is plausible, and in this paper I hope to have articulated reasons for thinking that 
it is, we ought to acknowledge that political theory requires a different sort of judgement to that 
assumed in most moralist worldviews: one that is much more historically and politically 
sensitive.32 
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